DePaul Business and Commercial
Law Journal
Volume 8
Issue 3 Spring 2010

Article 3

The Roles of Acceleration
David Hahn

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj

Recommended Citation
David Hahn, The Roles of Acceleration, 8 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 229 (2010)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj/vol8/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae.
For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

The Roles of Acceleration
David Hahn*

ABSTRACT

Acceleration clauses are found in most debt instruments. Upon the
occurrence of a predeterminedtriggering event, acceleration makes a
creditor'sfuture claim due and payable. While debt covenants have
been analyzed extensively in the academic literature,the role of acceleration has been overlooked.
This Paperexamines the role of accelerationclauses and maintains
that they play a critical role in debt financing. This Paperargues that
the prime role of acceleration is to perfect a complex set of governance mechanisms within the corporate setting. This governance role
is comprised of three parts. First, acceleration is a complementary
measure that supports debt covenants in mitigating ex ante the borrower's agency costs of self-interest actions. The other two parts of
the governance mechanism function ex post, upon the debtor's financial distress. Each deals with disciplininga different entity that may
generate wasteful costs to the creditor.
One entity that requires restrainingis the debtor. Acceleration facilitates the commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy and thus curtails any prospective losses to the creditors resulting from the
borrower's continuous moral hazard. The other entity a creditor
must worry about, which has been widely neglected by the financial
literature, is other self-interested creditors who rush to dismantle the
common debtor upon the latter's financial distress. Cross-acceleration clauses place all creditors on equal footing, establish an intercreditor balance of terror and prevent the creditorsfrom liquidating
the firm prematurely. Instead, cross-accelerationleads the creditors
to engage in collective negotiations and work out a comprehensive
restructuringof the firm's finance.
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INTRODUCTION

Loan transactions strike a deal between the parties under which the
borrower obtains cash from the lender in the present and promises to
pay it back in the future. In exchange for its willingness to depart
from cash it currently possesses, the lender is promised a fee in the
form of interest payments on the principal. A loan is a transaction on
the value of time, the two fundamental parameters of which are the
amount to be paid' and the time of payment. Nonetheless, debt instruments, whether in private loans or publicly issued debt, are
lengthy and contain many covenants and clauses that complement the
aforementioned core terms of the loan.2
Acceleration clauses are invariably included in loan documents. 3
Acceleration is a dependent clause the operation of which requires
triggering events. Such events are specified alongside the acceleration
clause in the agreement. Any failure of the borrower to comply with
one or more of the triggering clauses entitles the lender, the bondholders or their trustee to assert their right to accelerate the payment
of the loan.
Acceleration is the single most anti-loan clause in a loan agreement.
It collapses the entire principal and any accrued interest thereon and
makes them payable at once. That is, the schedule of the loan is abandoned in favor of an immediate resolution and termination of the parties' legal relationship. Acceleration clauses are widely considered an
important protection of creditors' rights. While the legal and financial
literature has discussed at length the essential role of debt covenants,4
it has barely analyzed the role and contribution of acceleration. This
1. The payment is comprised of the principal and the computed interest.
2. For further discussion see Part II infra.
3. Specifically with respect to secured loans, Grant Gilmore wrote over forty years ago that
"[for a hundred years . . . no security agreement has failed to include an acceleration clause". 2
GRArr GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.4, at 1195 (1965).
4. The seminal paper is Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On FinancialContracting:
An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979). This paper and the subsequent
literature focused on the debt-equity agency costs. As shall be elaborated below, this paper
understands some of the covenants and the acceleration clauses as tackling also an inter-creditor
conflict of interest.

2010]

THE ROLES OF ACCELERATION

231

Paper aims to fill this gap and analyze the various roles of acceleration
clauses.
A priori, acceleration may be conceived as an enforcement clause,
facilitating the collection of the loan. By modifying the original terms
of the agreement and making the entire amount payable on demand,
the creditor may move forward and use collection measures sanctioned by the applicable debtor-creditor law.5 In this sense, acceleration is an accessory of the contractual remedy of enforcement.
However, as shall be shown in this Paper, while some triggering events
justify utilizing collection measures, other events do not. Also, many
creditors, such as unsecured creditors, often face an economic reality
where their collection chances are dim. Thus, justifying acceleration
merely as a means of collection is rather weak.
This Paper argues that beyond facilitating collection, acceleration's
prime role is to enhance a creditor's control and governance. Acceleration complements the contractual covenants and serves as the ultimate stick over the heads of the disciplined constituencies. This Paper
shows that acceleration can advance creditor control and discipline
entities that generate wasteful costs to the creditor.
The first are the managers and equity holders of the borrower. The
contractual covenants, coupled with acceleration, deter opportunistic
behavior by the management at the expense of the creditors' rights. A
second entity a creditor must worry about, which has been widely neglected by the financial literature, are other self-interested creditors
who rush to dismantle the common debtor upon the latter's financial
distress. Creditors whose claims are payable in the future lack the
fundamental legal tools to practically protect their interests against a
run on the debtor's assets. This Paper will argue that cross-default
and acceleration clauses provide a creditor with those tools as they
place all creditors on equal footing and level the play-field. By making the claims of all creditors due and payable upon the default to one
creditor, acceleration clauses give each creditor a reliable threat
against the other creditors - the threat of dragging the debtor into
bankruptcy and thwarting their collection efforts. The all-creditor acceleration creates a constructive balance of terror among the creditors
that facilitates consensual workouts. 6
This Paper continues as follows. Part II outlines the prototypical
covenants included in debt instruments and the accompanying acceleration clauses and will distinguish between payout covenants, capital
5. Prior to a debtor's bankruptcy, state law governs the debtor-creditor relationship. However, once bankruptcy has been filed the federal bankruptcy law rules.
6. See infra in detail Part IV.C.
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structure covenants, asset substitution covenants and event risk covenants. It shall also point to the practice of including cross-default and
cross-acceleration clauses in the applicable instruments.
Part III critically examines the role of acceleration clauses as a
means of collection. The discussion shows that unsecured creditors,
and even secured creditors to an extent, gain little if any collection
benefits from acceleration. Thus, it concludes that collection is, at
best, only one face of acceleration.
Part IV reveals the principal roles of acceleration. It argues that
acceleration is intended to facilitate the control of a creditor over the
business and the fate of the borrower before and during the latter's
financial distress. Ex ante, debt covenants are intended to mitigate the
agency costs between the equity and debt holders of the firm, with the
management supposedly aligning their interests with the equity holders.7 Acceleration solidifies the legal hold a creditor has against any
borrower misbehavior. Ex post, once the firm has reached financial
distress, acceleration can facilitate a resort to formal bankruptcy either by the heavily indebted firm or by a creditor. The threat of bankruptcy keeps the creditor's check over the management. At the same
time, it also allows a creditor to credibly threaten its counterparts that
if they act selfishly and refuse to negotiate collectively it shall drag the
debtor along with all its creditors into court-controlled formal bankruptcy. These reliable threats serve as an impetus for consensual solutions among all interested parties.
II.

DEBT COVENANTS AND ACCELERATION CLAUSES

Private loans and public debt instruments usually include covenants
limiting the borrowing firm's freedom of action. Debt instruments include both affirmative and negative covenants. Affirmative covenants
require the firm to discharge its fundamental contractual obligations
and report to the creditor on a regular stipulated basis. Negative covenants restrict the firm's freedom to enter transactions, transfer property or initiate any other action that may increase the risk of default
on the debt. 8 The firm also undertakes to maintain certain financial
ratios that reduce its risk of default on the payment obligations.
7. On the management's inclination to align their interests with the equityholders even at time
of the firm's financial distress, see Geroge G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-inPossession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 918 (1993); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and
Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 509 (1992).
8. Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A
Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189, 222 (1995).
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This part outlines the common debt covenants and the common
practice of cross-default and acceleration clauses.
A.

Four Types of Covenants

The precise nature of the covenants included in a debt instrument
varies from one transaction to another. The lender's credit officers or
the indenture trustee on behalf of bondholders will factor the size of
the loan, the firm's financial strength, the firm's bargaining power, and
the lender's degree of comfort with the firm's management into the
design of the debt instrument. 9 In addition, the design will also be
affected by the general conditions of the market at the time of the
loan. During high tides in the financial markets creditors may display
some leniency towards the borrowing firm and relax the covenants
somewhat.10 In contrast, during down periods creditors will stiffen the
terms and insist on the inclusion of stricter covenants. Moreover,
some covenants may be included as a periodica reaction to certain
borrowers' activities and practice that have previously contributed to
defaults, or merely as innovative legal and contractual fashions."
Nonetheless, certain prototypical covenants are common in loan
transactions. These covenants may be divided into four broad groups:
payout covenants, capital structure covenants, asset substitution covenants and event risk covenants.
1. Payout Covenants
This group is comprised of covenants limiting the borrower's ability
to initiate distributions to its shareholders, either by formally announced dividends, spin-offs 12 stock repurchases, stock redemptions
or otherwise. Payout covenants may limit distributions by the issuer
9. Robert M. Lloyd, FinancialCovenants in Commercial Loan Documentation:Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335, 340 (1991).
10. The phenomenon of covenant-light loans has been common practice even in the most
sophisticated and developed financial markets. This leniency was, inter alia, a result of the desire
of hedge funds and private equity managers to close as many deals as possible and get paid their
bonuses as a result thereof. See Harvey R. Miller, Chapterll in Transition - From Boom to Bust
and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 380-83 (2007).
11. Yaxuan Qi & John Wald, State Law and Debt Covenants 51 J. L. & ECON. 179, 191
(2008).
12. Covenants combating spin-offs detrimental to the corporate bondholders are discussed in
F. John Stark, III, J. Andrew Rahl, Jr. & Lori C. Seegers, "Marriott Risk": A New Model
Covenant to Restrict Transfers of Wealth from Bondholders to Stockholders, 1994 COLUm. Bus.
L. REV. 503.
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alone or may limit business group payouts, namely by subsidiaries and
affiliates of the issuer.' 3
2.

Capital Structure Covenants

Capital structure covenants restrict the debtor's freedom to finance
its business through relatively risky capital structures. This group includes covenants that limit the total debt a debtor may incur, either in
a total amount or through assets to liabilities or current assets to current liabilities ratio, and covenants that limit the aggregation of debt
through controlled subsidiaries. In addition, negative pledge clauses' 4
are covenants that often curtail the debtor's practical ability to finance
itself with additional debt.15 Negative pledge clauses protect the holders of unsecured debt,16 while secured debt is complemented by covenants restricting junior liens.17 By imposing the aforementioned
limitations these covenants effectively design the firm's capital
structure.
3.

Asset Substitution Covenants

These covenants limit the firm from engaging in various transactions that may result in substitution of high risk and volatile assets for
solid and low risk assets. Such transactions may include asset sales
and investments by the borrower firm alone, or through its
subsidiaries.18
13. Payout covenants also effectively design the borrower's capital structure, alongside the
direct capital structure covenants, because these covenants make the payouts a function of the
borrower's capital structure. John K. Wald, Capital Structure with Dividend Restrictions, 5 J.
CORP. FIN. 193 (1999). Qi and Wald found recently that corporate state laws with stricter distribution rules serve as a proxy for payout covenants. Qi & Wald, supra note 11, at 191-94.
14. For a discussion whether a negative pledge clause constitutes an Article 9 security interest
see generally Thomas C. Mitchell, The Negative Pledge Clause and The Classificationof Financing Devices - A Question of Perspective, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153 (1986). See also Peter F.
Coogan, Homer Kripke & Fredric Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: SubordinationAgreements, Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation
Agreements, 79 HARv. L. REV. 229 (1965). For an understanding of negative pledge clauses as
mere contractual (and thus, unsecured) undertakings of debtors, see e.g. Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 652 (1992).
15. McDaniel noted that negative pledge clauses are often complemented by covenants barring the borrower from entering into sale and leaseback transactions, since such transactions
may serve as a proxy to security interests. Morey W. McDaniel, Are Negative Pledge Clauses in
Public Debt Issues Obsolete?, 38 Bus. LAw. 867 (1983).
16. Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and
Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 311 (1999).
17. Lloyd, supra note 9, at 340-41.
18. Qi and Wald consider also sale and leaseback covenants as asset substitution covenants.
Qi & Wald, supra note 11, at 188, Table 1. However, these transactions are financing transactions in which the nature of the firm's assets is not altered.
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Event Risk Covenants

This group includes covenants that make substantial alterations of
the firm's risk profile, initiated by the firm or a third party, in the
event of a default.19 Alterations of the firm's risk profile include the
acquisition of a certain percentage of the debtor's shares by a third
party, a merger or consolidation, a change in the composition of the
board of directors, or a repurchase by the borrower of certain percentage of its own shares. Change of control exacerbates the risk to other
creditors when it involves a leveraged acquisition. 20 Event risk covenants may be accompanied by a clause that entitles the creditors to
contractual remedies only when they trigger a credit rating decline. 21
B.

Cross Defaults

Aside from specified covenants, debt contracts invariably contain
cross-default clauses. These clauses trigger defaults by the borrower
vis-A-vis its other creditors once a payment or another default occurred in its contractual relationship with any one of its creditors.
Also, under such clauses the initiation of enforcement actions by an
informed third party, such as levying of the borrower's assets, the imposition of a judgment lien or even the filing of a lawsuit against the
borrower triggers a default on the debt contract. 22
C.

Acceleration Clauses

Complementing the various covenants in debt contracts are acceleration clauses. Acceleration clauses entitle the lender or the indenture
trustee, on behalf of the bondholders, to accelerate the entire principle upon the occurrence of specified events and make it immediately
due and payable regardless of the original payment terms of the
contract.
The triggering events for acceleration vary. First and foremost, a
loan will be accelerated upon the borrower's default on its payment
obligation. In addition, the borrower's failure to comply with its capital structure covenants or its violation of the payout or event risk cov19. Paul Asquith & Thierry A. Wizman, Event Risk, Covenants, and Bondholder Returns in
Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 195 (1990).
20. Kahan and Klausner identify event risk covenants primarily with a change in the borrower's credit quality. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in
Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1993).
21. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 741-42 (1997).
22. See Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign versus Corporate
Debt, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 977, 980 (2007).
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enants will awake the lenders' or bondholders' right of acceleration.
Furthermore, acceleration clauses may provide that the lender or
bondholders' may accelerate the loan whenever they feel that the
prospect of payment is impaired due to negative news or adverse information about the borrower's business. 23
In accord with the practice of cross-default provisions debt contracts also contain cross-acceleration clauses. 24 Cross-acceleration entitles the lender to accelerate and call its loan upon acceleration by
any other creditor on its loan. 25
To the extent the materially adverse changes reflect an insolvencyrelated event the loan will be accelerated automatically and immediately; while other events, such as failure to comply with affirmative
covenants, may trigger a deferred right to accelerate that will materialize only after the expiration of a grace period for curing the failure
and complying with the terms of the contract. 26
III.

THE COLLECTION ROLE OF ACCELERATION

Studying the essential role of acceleration begins with its power to
promote collection. This part examines the contribution of acceleration to the collection of debts. Analyzing acceleration clauses in secured debt instruments first and then in unsecured debt instruments,
this Paper shows that when the borrowing firm is in a dire financial
state the collection of many claims is hardly practical.
A.

Means of Collection

The most trivial and readily apparent role of acceleration is to facilitate the creditor's right to collect its loan. It allows the lender to abort
the contractual time schedule for payments and extract from the firm
all payments at once. This immunizes the creditor from any future
adverse events. To the extent the triggering event is a periodical pay23. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the Rhetoric of Good
Faith, 1998 BAYLOR LAw. REV.

1035; Bernstein, supra note 8.

24. Qi & Wald, supra note 11, at 187-88. Interestingly, they found cross-acceleration clauses
in 52.7% of the bonds in their sample while cross-default clauses were found in only 4.2%. Id. at
Table 1. This may indicate that acceleration, and cross-acceleration as a result thereof, are triggered more by general material adverse changes in the firm's state than by violations of specific
covenants.
25. For a study of cross-acceleration clauses in public debt instruments and their relation to
the debtholders' decision to delegate the borrower's monitoring to the banks see Anne Beatty,
Scott Liao & Joseph Weber, Evidence on the Determinantsand Economic Consequences of Delegated Monitoring (U. Toronto, Dec. 2008), available at http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/accounting/S.Liao.pdf (last visited Jan. 18th, 2010).
26. George A. Nation, III, PrepaymentFees in Commercial PromissoryNotes: Applicability to
Payments Made Because of Acceleration, 72 TENN. L. REV. 613, 624 (2005).
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ment default, acceleration effectively terminates the parties' ongoing
contractual relationship.
When the triggering default is not a payment obligation but rather
the failure to comply with another contractual covenant, acceleration
epitomizes an anticipated contractual breach of the payment obligations. 27 It entitles the prospective aggrieved party, the lender, to spare
itself the adverse effects of a future actual payment default and enhances its collection of the loan. By collecting its loan upon the occurrence of a single default, the lender mitigates any foreseeable damages
it may sustain should it await and pursue collection only on the original payment dates. 28
Viewed from this ex post perspective, acceleration is primarily an
accessory to the payment obligations of the borrower. Acceleration
clauses are the contractual bridge between actual or anticipated violations of payment obligations and the contractual remedies of full performance or damages.
B.

The Limited Efficacy of Collection

Acceleration clauses are found both in unsecured and secured debt
contracts. To the extent acceleration facilitates the collection of the
debt, it appears applicable regardless of the debt's priority ranking.
Yet the following discussion shows that collecting an accelerated unsecured debt is vastly different than collecting an accelerated secured
debt. The dim chance of collection faced by unsecured creditors when
a debtor experiences financial distress demonstrates the limited efficacy of acceleration as a mere collection measure and highlights the
need for a richer understanding of acceleration. The next part will
develop such an understanding by exploring and analyzing the role of
acceleration clauses as mechanisms of governance.
1. Secured Debt
When collateral secures a private loan or publicly issued bonds, acceleration assists the claimants to collect from the borrowing firm.
27. See also Darlene M. Nowak, Standardsfor Insecurity Acceleration Under Section 1-208 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal for Reform, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 623, 624
(1979-1980) (a creditor's stipulated right of acceleration when it deems its interests insecure is
recognized both under the U.C.C. and under the common law).
28. This protection of the lender is particularly important in contractual relationships under
which the creditor provides an ongoing revolving credit to the borrowing firm. By accelerating
the outstanding debt and terminating the contract the creditor absolves itself from risking future
credit to the firm. A similar approach can be found in bankruptcy. Section 365(b) of the Bankruptcy Code relieves the non-debtor party from continuing subjecting itself to an executory contract absent the curing of all past defaults by the debtor.
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Under the law of secured transactions, a creditor cannot foreclose on
the collateral before the specified time of payment or the occurrence
of another default. 29 To the extent the payment of the loan is in the
far future, the creditor is vulnerable to adverse changes in the firm's
conditions that may impair chances of collecting the full claim upon
the predetermined payment date. Acceleration clauses may be understood as the mechanism abridging the time gap between the future
due date of the payment and the current precarious financial state of
the debtor. By entitling the creditor to accelerate once the firm has
financially deteriorated, acceleration clauses enhance the creditor's
foreclosure rights and dramatically improve its ability to collect. 30 Absent acceleration, the creditor would be compelled to watch the
debtor's deterioration without any legal means to protect its claim
before its own payment's due date.
Foreclosure and collection are justified where future payments to
the creditor are at risk. Yet, a close look at the various debt covenants
reveals that the link between certain covenants and an actual risk to
the secured creditor's collection rights is relatively remote. To the extent that a covenant violation impairs or threatens to impair the value
of the creditor's collateral, seizing the collateral at its present state
and initiating foreclosure fixes the creditor's position and spares it any
loss due to future devaluation. Thus, an asset substitution violation or
distributions to the shareholders out of a creditor's collateral justify
acceleration and collection of the debt as a measure of stopping the
creditor's own bleeding. In contrast, the violation of risk event covenants, such as a change of control of the borrower or an alteration of
the composition of the borrower's board of directors, does not necessarily entail a direct and actual risk to the value of the collateral even
if the change of control entails an increase in the firm's leverage. In a
similar vein, the borrower incurring debt beyond the maximum contractual dollar amount allowed does not impede the secured creditor's
senior payment rights from its collateral. 3 ' A creditor is concerned
primarily with the size of the slice it shall actually receive from the
debtor's pie once its payment is due. Securing its claim with collateral
and gaining priority as a result thereof is a sufficient protection of the
29. See generally U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
30. Similarly, by making a monetary claim due and payable acceleration facilitates common
law set-off between two bank accounts owned by an identical customer. See Edward L. Rubin,
The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.
Q. 11, 39 (1997).

31. Limitations on the borrower's power to incur debt are categorized as capital structure
covenants. See supra Part II.A.2.
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creditor's interests. 32 Through its collateral the secured creditor enjoys
absolute priority over any other claimant once the creditor's payment
becomes due, or - in the case of bankruptcy - when all payments be-

come due. 3 3 Even acceleration by another junior creditor will not impair the creditor's right to get the first bite at the collateral. It follows
that acceleration based on defaults not related to the value of the collateral cannot be explained merely as a measure facilitating collection
by the secured party.
2.

Unsecured Debt

In theory, unsecured creditors would like to maintain an exit, or
call, option on their loan upon the occurrence of certain adverse
events in the firm's backyard. To avoid suffering from the continuing
deterioration of the firm and the value decrease of their expected collection upon the original due date, unsecured creditors include acceleration clauses in the hope of cutting their losses.
Yet, this explanation of acceleration is again unpersuasive. This understanding of acceleration essentially justifies a creditor's strategy of
"take the money and run." From an individual creditor's vantage
point this may indeed be the desired strategy, but from the perspective of social welfare this strategy is liable to prove destructive as it
reduces the overall return to the creditors as a group. Condoning acceleration as a device for early collection jump starts the famous prisoner's dilemma of "race to collection,"34 which underscores the need
for a collective regime, like bankruptcy, to resolve the creditors'
rights.3 5 Unsecured claims have no priority and rank equal to one
another (paripassu). A collection by one creditor is no more justifiable than the collection by any other unsecured creditor. To the extent
32. But see Thomas S.Y. Ho & Ronald F. Singer, Bond Indenture Provisions and the Risk of
Corporate Debt, 10 J. FIN. ECON. 375 (1982) (arguing that the full payment of short-term junior
debt may impair the rights of long-term senior debt holders).
33. The commencement of a bankruptcy case constitutes an acceleration of all claims against
the debtor. See, e.g. Theodore Eisenberg, A Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itself, 39
STAN.

L. REV. 1519, 1529-30 (1987).

34. Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, Protectionfor Whom? Creditor Conflict and
Bankruptcy, 6 AM. L & ECON. REV. 249 (2004); Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, Co-ordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures, 113 ECON. J. 276, 281-84
(2003); J. Bradley Johnson, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 233 et seq.
(1991).
35. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and Creditors' Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 907 (1982); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY

LAw Ch. 1 (1986); see also Barry E. Adler, Financialand Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) (arguing that bankruptcy is no less a political
compromise accepted by the parties than a pure solution to the economic problem of a common
pool). .
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the debtor's financial conditions deteriorate and all creditors fear that
eventually they will not be paid in full, a multi-party race to collect
transpires, which further tailspins the debtor, to the detriment of the
creditors as a whole.3 6 Acceleration exacerbates this race to collection
as it allows more creditors to presently join the race. It facilitates collection by the speedy and skilled creditors with the potential of further
harming the less fortunate ones.37
Moreover, in the case of a debtor who is also indebted to secured
creditors acceleration by unsecured creditors upon the deterioration
of the debtor's financial state seems somewhat futile. Given the common practice of including cross-acceleration clauses in debt contracts,
the acceleration of unsecured debt would only expedite foreclosure by
secured creditors on their collateral. This would pave a short path to
liquidation of the debtor and leave the unsecured creditors, i.e., the
triggering creditors, with hardly any value for collection.
In the best case scenario (from an individual creditor's perspective)
an astute creditor may benefit from expedited collection. But given
the detrimental effect for the debtor and the creditors as a whole it is
doubtful whether this collection is desirable. Moreover, to the extent
that the debtor will enter bankruptcy within three months after the
collection by the accelerating creditor that creditor's success will be
negated as the collection would be challenged as an avoidable
preference.38
Thus, from the perspective of unsecured creditors acceleration generates little, if any, collection benefits. Actual collection notwithstanding, a default on debt covenants, backed by an acceleration
clause, may nonetheless strongly affect the operations of the borrower
firm. This is discussed in the following part.
IV.

THE GOVERNANCE ROLES OF ACCELERATION

Going against conventional wisdom, it is arguable that the prime
roles of acceleration clauses are enhancing efficient corporate governance. Acceleration serves the creditor both ex ante and ex post. Ex
ante it deters strategic, self-interested behavior on the part of borrowers during the life of the underlying debt. Ex post, once the borrowing
firm faces financial distress, acceleration allows the creditor to curtail
36. The race to collection may also exacerbate a zero-sum game. WINTON E. WILLIAMS,
(1998).
37. Acceleration clauses are most common in debt instruments negotiated and executed by
financial institutions or a skilled indenture trustee.
38. Bankruptcy Code §547(b), 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).
GAMES CREDITORS PLAY Ch. 4
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any further damage potentially inflicted by the equity-management
coalition and suspend self-interested actions taken by other creditors.
This part examines three constructive roles of acceleration as a tool
of governance. First, it examines acceleration as a complementary element of debt covenants in combating the debt agency costs. Secondly, it portrays acceleration as an effective means to commence
timely bankruptcy cases and bar future mismanagement of the borrower firm. Finally, it discusses the contribution of acceleration as a
means of inducing creditors with conflicting interests to negotiate collectively and design a comprehensive workout for the distressed firm.
A.

Governing Debtor Misbehavior

1. The Debt Agency Problem
The complicated and intertwined effects of a firm's finance sources,
namely equity and debt, on the managing of its affairs have spawned a
large volume of academic literature. On one hand, debt is considered
a positive component of a firm's financing. Debt financing has been
understood as an effective restriction on management's control over
the firm's free cash flow. That is, debt forces management to pay out
its accumulated cash to the investors and frustrates any self-interested
plans of managers to maintain the generated cash in the firm for advancing their personal benefits (increased compensation, promotion
etc.). 3 9 In addition, by imposing the possible costs of bankruptcy, debt
is desirable for equity holders as it threatens the management and
compels it to manage the firm with care. 40 Also, as debt substitutes
equity in the firm's capital structure a fixed equity investment by the
managers represents an increasing proportion of total equity. This
reduces the agency costs between management and the equity holders
and encourages the managers to maximize the return on equity. 41
On the other hand, the very existence of debt alongside equity exacerbates the agency problem between these two interested groups of
investors. This agency problem was first analyzed over thirty years
39. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance and Takeovers, 76
AM. EcoN. REv. 323, 324 (1986).
40. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, CorporateFinancialStructure and ManagerialIncentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107 (1982); see also Allen N.

Berger & Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti, Capital Structure and Firm Performance:A New Approach
to Testing Agency Theory and an Application to the Banking Industry, 30 J. BANKING & FIN.
1065, 1071-72 (2006).
41. Adler, supra note 35, at 317.
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ago by Michael Jensen, William Meckling and Eugene Fama. 4 2 The
debt agency problem drives the firm's managers to take deliberate actions that increase their pecuniary compensation and the expected return on equity while imperiling the firm's overall value and thus
potentially impeding the return to its debt holders. Barring any restrictions, upon the obtaining of debt managers are liable to gamble
on the creditors' money in various ways including: extending generous
payouts to themselves and the equity holders, over or under investing,
increasing the firm's leverage, or engaging in asset substitution. 43 This
externalization is aggravated when the firm incurs more debt and increases its risk of insolvency. 44
2. Covenants as Tools of Governance
Unlike shareholders, creditors hardly enjoy corporate statutory or
case law rights. The financial agency problem is addressed primarily
by contractual measures. Since the seminal paper by Smith and
Warner, it has been widely acknowledged that debt contracts and the
covenants included therein serve as an important mechanism combating the agency costs of debt. 4 5 The contractual covenants are a bonding device that decreases the cost of credit. 4 6 Through the covenants
the firm (or its managers) undertakes to abstain from the aforementioned corporate activities that may impede the creditors' investments.
These contractual undertakings will be monitored, and if necessary,
enforced by the private lender, the bondholders, or a delegated monitoring agent on their behalf. 4 7 The creditors may enforce their interests and gain effective, albeit informal, control and influence over the
corporate affairs. 48 The debt contract is an important mechanism for
imposing a check on management's wide discretion in operating and
42. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
43. Smith & Warner, supra note 4.
44. Richard C. Green & Eli Talmor, Asset Substitution and the Agency Costs of Debt Financing, 10 J. BANKING & FIN. 391 (1986).
45. Smith & Warner, supra note 4.
46. A substitute measure for controlling the debt-equity conflict is the extension of short-term
credit. This limits the managers' opportunities to expropriate the corporate assets in favor of the
equity holders. Matthew T. Billett, Tao-Hsien Dolly King & David C. Mauer, Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants, 62 J. FIN. 697, 697 (2007).
47. Mitchell Berlin & Jan Locys, Bond Covenants and Delegated Monitoring, 43 J. FIN. 397,
398 (1988); see generally Douglas W. Diamond, FinancialIntermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393 (1984).

48. Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in
Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 127-28 (2009).
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financing the firm. 4 9 It is a central piece of the creditors' tools of corporate governance, alongside the obtaining of security interests5 0 or
the breaking of the firm's assets and operations into separate corporate entities. 5
Some commentators view the operation of covenants as a governance measure intended to hold management at bay with the benefits
of this control inuring to all stakeholders, debt and equity alike. 52
That is, they view the operation of debt covenants as a tool in the
arsenal against management's agency problem vis-d-vis all the firm's
investors rather than the narrow scope of the equity-debt agency
problem.5 3
A close examination of the prototypical covenants reveals that they
are designed particularly to serve as an ex ante deterrence against the
hazard of borrower misbehavior. The payout covenants restrain the
firm's management and directors from displaying over-generosity to
the shareholders at the expense of a diluted pool of assets left for
repaying the firm's creditors.
Event risk covenants work similarly. Requiring the consent of a
creditor to a change of control of the borrowing firm is intended to
limit the creditor's exposure to increasingly risky investments and operations. The creditor has not negotiated the extension of credit with
the new group acquiring the control. The new controlling group's business philosophy may pose an excessive level of risk to the creditor.
Hence, the creditor includes a covenant requiring its consent to the
change of control to combat such a conspicuous alteration in the borrowing firm's risk profile
The financial structure covenants provide a buffer against the management's inclination to over-borrow and expand the firm's acquisi49. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1216 (2006).
50. On security interests as a monitoring device on the firm's management see, e.g., Saul
Levmore, Monitoringand Freeridersin Commercialand CorporateSettings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 5557 (1982); Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEo. L.J.
1, 11-25 (1997); see generally Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
209 (1989); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
901 (1986).
51. On the virtue of separation of corporate entities see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of OrganizationalLaw, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (2000).
52. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
921, 937 (2007); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1995).
53. Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung & Albert H. Yoon, What Else Mattersfor Corporate
Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 1010 (2008).
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tions and business development beyond its projected cash-flow. 54
Through the contractual requirement to preserve a certain positive
net worth the equity holders are left with a significant stake in the firm
that they might lose should the management mismanage the firm.
Thus, it secures the effective monitoring of the management's actions
by the equity holders from which the debt holders benefit.
3. Acceleration - Perfecting the Governance
Debt covenants are intended to deter borrower misbehavior, ameliorate the risk of payment defaults, and preserve the value of the
creditors' investment. The covenants are thus the cause for a creditor's action. Acceleration is the means of action. Through its right to
accelerate the debt, the creditor can materialize the consequences of a
covenant violation and inflict severe harm to the borrower's operations and survival as a viable entity. It is the ultimate threat of a creditor against the borrower or its management. It translates a nonpayment default into an actual payment default and negates the firm's
benefit of utilizing the creditor's investment over time. Absent the
creditor's contractual power to call the entire loan back the force of
the covenants would diminish. A borrower who is aware of the limited enforcement options of its creditors would attach a lower price
tag to a potential covenant violation. Acceleration is, thus, the complementary measure that adds credibility to the covenants' intended
deterrence. It perfects the threat by signaling to the borrower that it
better not dare to even think about violating the covenants.55
Some commentators emphasized that the efficacy of debt covenants
as a means of governance is not contingent on actual acceleration and
collection of the debt. Once a violation has occurred the creditor has
an option to accelerate, but it may elect to not exercise it. Rather,
creditors may prefer to renegotiate the terms of the loan with the violating firm and proceed with their investment.56 The creditor's actual
choice notwithstanding, acceleration's force lies in its threatening po54. The contractual limitation of merger transactions combats both the peril of surpassing the
borrower's allowed maximum leverage ratio and the risks inherent in the change of control of
the business. The increase of leverage entailed in a merger transaction may result from the
financing of the acquiring corporation through debt or from the target corporation being overloaded with debt.
55. Another method to combat voluntary defaults by a borrower is to complicate the borrower's ability to restructure the loan after the occurrence of the default. This can be accomplished by involving a large number of creditors in a loan syndicate. Benjamin C. Esty &
William L. Megginson, Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Debt Ownership Structure: Evidence
from the GlobalSyndicated Loan Market, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 37, 53 (2003).
56. Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., The Maturity Structure of CorporateDebt, 50
J. FIN. 609, 611 (1995).

2010]1

THE ROLES OF ACCELERATION

245

tential.57 Ex post, a creditor may actually call the loan back through
acceleration (applying an exit strategy) or renegotiate the loan (applying a voice strategy), but ex ante the borrower's management realizes
that the ultimate destructive alternative, acceleration, is a loaded gun
the creditor points to its head. Thus, management's slack is contained.
B.

The Gate to Insolvency

An additional important role of acceleration can be seen in the context of insolvency. Upon a payment default or financial deterioration,
acceleration can expedite the resolution of insolvency related interests
of creditors. Two matters may be resolved by acceleration. First, acceleration of the entire loan may render the borrower insolvent and
thus end its free control over its assets. Secondly, acceleration may
facilitate the procedural standing of a creditor to file an involuntary
bankruptcy petition against the borrower. These matters are discussed below.
1. Accelerating Insolvency
By making the entire loan due and payable upon a payment default
acceleration substantiates the borrower's state of insolvency or near
insolvency. It makes the curing of the default practically impossible.58
This helps address a transpiring debt-equity conflict of interest. Acceleration refutes any potential attempt by equity holders, upon the
payment default, to infuse minimal cash contributions and extend
their hold and control over the financially distressed borrower. 59 That
is, beyond its role as an ex ante deterrent against borrower's misbehavior, upon actual contract violation acceleration effectively bars any
future harm and subsequent payment or non-payment violations by
the equity-management coalition. This coalition has everything to
gain from future activity but little to lose. Acceleration blocks their
continuous gambling with the creditors' money 60 and practically
forces the management to file for bankruptcy protection of the firm.
57. Gulati & Triantis, supra note 22, at 980-81.
58. Paul B. Lewis, Can't Pay Your Debts, Mate? A Comparison of the Australian and American Personal Bankruptcy Systems, 18 BANK. DEV. J. 297, 314 (2002).
59. Adler, supra note 41, at 325.
60. In this sense, acceleration is a practical proxy to a party's right to terminate a contract
upon its breach by the counter-party. Termination is of little use in situations when the nonbreaching party has completed performing all of its obligations under the contract. Thus, the
creditor who has already advanced the loan is better off accelerating the repayment of the loan
and collecting from the borrower than merely terminating the contract and suing the borrower in
court for restitution damages.
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2. Facilitating Involuntary Petitions
Another feature of acceleration is that it translates future payment
obligations to due and current payments. A creditor may wish to assert its rights against the ailing firm once its financial state deteriorated. Yet, to the extent that creditor's entire claim is payable only in
the future it may presently lack the necessary standing to act against
the firm. Accelerating the payments allows the creditor to take timely
action and protect the value of the firm's assets from future decrease.
A creditor may protect the firm's assets from misuse by filing an
involuntary bankruptcy petition. Assuming the firm will controvert
the involuntary petition, the court will order relief against the debtor
firm only if it "is generally not paying its debts as they become due". 6'
Absent acceleration, the creditor may fail to establish that the firm is
generally not paying its debts as they become due. The test courts
have applied for determining whether a debtor is generally not paying
its debts as they become due is a weighted average test which factors
various elements such as the number of debts, the amount of the delinquency, the materiality of the nonpayment, the nature and conduct
of the debtor's business, the amount of the debtor's debts compared
to the debtor's yearly income and the debtor's voluntary shutdown of
operations. 62 Given this test, acceleration solidifies the creditor's petition as it increases the amount of current debt that is due and cannot
be paid by the debtor firm.
This role of acceleration is specifically important in jurisdictions
that are less hospitable to corporate reorganizations and rely more on
insolvency proceedings such as liquidation or receivership commenced
by creditors to resolve a debtor's financial distress. In contrast, the
vast majority of bankruptcy cases in the U.S. are commenced voluntarily by the debtor. 63 Nonetheless, as discussed above, even in such a
regime acceleration is likely to drive the borrower's management to
file for bankruptcy.

61. Bankruptcy Code

§ 303(h)(1),

11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (2006).

62. 2-303 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 303.14(b)(1) (15th ed. 2008).

63. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the DisappearingBusiness
Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV. 743, 749, n.11 (2005); Ethan S. Bernstein, All's Fairin Love, War
& Bankruptcy? Corporate Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in FinancialDistress, 11
STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 298, 299, n.3 (2006); Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, Table 3 (Jan. 8, 2008). COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY CENTER
FOR LAW AND EcoNoMIcs STUDIEs, RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 321 available at http://

ssrn.com/abstract=1081661
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EncouragingInter-CreditorArrangements

Governing the debtor's misbehavior and facilitating insolvency are
two related roles of acceleration. Both explain acceleration as a
means of protecting the rights of the accelerating creditor or the creditors as a whole vis-a-vis the debtor, its management and its equity
holders. Yet these roles of acceleration still fail to explain certain aspects of its operation. First, the inclusion of acceleration in unsecured
or junior debt contracts is hard to justify based on these roles. Secondly, these roles cannot explain accelerations that are triggered by
events that are beyond the management's control.
In the following paragraphs, I shall argue that in such circumstances
acceleration should be viewed as an inter-creditor oriented vehicle,
intended to facilitate collective creditor arrangements upon the insolvency of the common borrowing firm.
1. The Limits of Debtor Oriented Acceleration
Monitoring borrower misbehavior is predicated on effective deterrence. Creditors can deter the firm either through the threat of withholding potential future advances of credit or through the threat of
calling the current loan back. Acceleration is the necessary element
that makes the stick held by the creditor over the borrower's head
truly intimidating and effective. I have shown above that upon the
deterioration of the borrower's financial state, unsecured creditors are
less likely to pursue collection since the prospect of prevailing is
bleak. 6 4 The creditors' weak interest to collect at a time the borrower
is in dire straits is no secret to the firm's management. Thus, upon the
firm's financial distress, at the point where the debt agency hazard is
most acute, acceleration clauses barely deter the management and the
risk of misbehavior is aggravated. 6 5
To be sure, debt covenants may nonetheless maintain their deterring effect even when the borrowing firm is in financial distress. To
the extent a default on the covenants entitles the creditors to remove
the management from office and appoint a new executive team at the
corporate helm, the covenants appear to be as powerful as before. 66
Yet, this constructive disciplining effect has relatively little to do with
acceleration.
64. See supra Part III.B.2.
65. Acceleration is likely to restrain the management at earlier stages, before the firm encounters financial distress. Thus, early acceleration may be justified under the "controlling the
borrower" role of acceleration. The main text argues, however, that the more severe the firm's
actual financial state the weaker this rationale of acceleration.
66. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 49 at 1233.
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Another problem with the debtor disciplining rationales of acceleration is that certain defaults and triggering events are unrelated to any
borrower misbehavior and may be beyond management's control. 67
For example, financial structure covenants may require the firm to
maintain certain financial ratios throughout the life of the loan. Failure to maintain such ratios constitutes default and accelerates the payment of the entire loan. While a firm's failure to meet a stipulated
financial ratio may be the result of poor managerial decisions, it may
also result from general, non-firm specific, circumstances such as a
general depreciation in the value of assets in the market.68 Likewise,
an economic downturn may trigger defaults on loans across the
board. 69
Acceleration may also be triggered by cross-default clauses. The
filing of a lawsuit against the borrower by a third party or levying on a
borrower's asset by one of its creditors may trigger a cross-default and
entitle another creditor to accelerate.70 Yet the underlying triggering
event once again may be beyond the management's control.
The role of acceleration as a debtor disciplining measure fails to
justify accelerations triggered by the aforementioned events. Deterrence against actions beyond the control of a disciplined person is simply irrelevant.
2. An Inter-Creditor Balance of Terror
The virtue of acceleration in the case of a borrower's financial distress lies in its constructive effect on the creditors' internal conflict
regardless of the firm and its management. Once a common debtor
enters a phase of financial deterioration, the creditors face a common
pool problem and are tempted to act in a selfish manner to enhance
one's own collection even if it sabotages the collective good of the
67. Setting quantity covenants that are beyond the management's control is more frequent in
private lending contracts than in public debt offerings, because the parties to these contracts are
fewer and their ability to closely monitor such clauses and renegotiate upon the firm's failure to
meet the covenant is better. Marcel Kahan, & Bruce Tuckman, Private vs. Public Lending:
Evidence from Covenants, UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management. (1993), available
at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1xw4w7sk.
68. Richard M. Gray, Does the Crisis Bring Default under MAC Clauses?, 17 INr'L FIN. L.
REV. 17, 18-19 (1998).
69. Certain debt instruments may exclude changes in general economic conditions. Yet the
covenants and their exclusions are subject to interpretation. Thus, invoking default based on
general economic changes invites litigation. Victoria Ivashina, & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the FinancialCrisis of 2008, p.14, n.10 (July 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1297337.
70. Gulati & Triantis, supra note 22 at 980.
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creditors as a whole.71 An adverse race to collection is liable to
squander the debtor's property and destruct its going-concern value. 72
Creditors with junior priorities or creditors whose payments dates are
in the distant future are concerned that the senior and expedient creditors will press for an expedited and sub-value maximizing foreclosure
on the borrower's property that eventually will leave them empty
handed. On the other hand, senior creditors are concerned that expedient junior creditors may interfere with their collateral, forcing the
senior creditors to foreclose early and thus frustrate the undisturbed
stream of payments by the firm.
Cross-defaults and cross-acceleration are the weapons by which
creditors discipline one another. By making the violation of a covenant to one creditor or the acceleration by that creditor an event of
acceleration towards other creditors of the debtor, the other creditors
assert a firm position to take necessary legal actions to protect their
claims and prevent an unnecessary or hasty liquidation of the debtor's
property. Even if collection of their own claims is impractical because
of their junior priority or the low value of the total debtor's assets, the
accelerated debts allow the other creditors nonetheless to initiate a
formal bankruptcy case. The opportunity to initiate bankruptcy, either by filing their own involuntary petition or by driving the debtor's
management to file a voluntary petition as a defense against the accelerated debts,73 is an effective threat through which each creditor
draws the attention of the other creditors to its rights. A bankruptcy
filing is a unilateral act that a creditor may utilize should it feel deprived by other creditors. The filing of a bankruptcy petition entails
the automatic stay against all creditors, unsecured and secured alike,74
and subjects them to the jurisdiction and rulings of a bankruptcy
court. Similarly, through bankruptcy creditors may avoid and recover
a recent payment made to another unsecured creditor as a
preference.75
To the extent the creditors wish to avoid bankruptcy, its formalities
and limitations, the mutual threat by creditors against one another
71. Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 343
(1993); Richard V. Butler and Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-Examination of the Purpose and Goals
of Bankruptcy, 2 AM. BANKR.

INST. L. REV. 269, 269-73 (1994).

72. Picker argued, however, that according priority to secured creditors prevents the creation
of a common pool in the first place and discourages other creditors from asserting wasteful
collection actions. Picker, supra note 14 at 657.
73. See supra Part IV.B.2.
74. Bankruptcy Code § 362(a), 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2008).
75. Id. § 547. The preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code may serve as the very catalyst
for a bankruptcy filing. Daniels & Triantis, supra note 52 at 1095.
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acts as an impetus for all parties to negotiate collectively and work out
a consensual liquidation or reorganization plan.76 Acceleration thus
drives the parties towards a consensual conclusion for the debtor's financial distress. That is the added value of cross defaults and cross
accelerations.
V.

CONCLUSION

Acceleration clauses are a fixture in debt instruments. They accompany the debt covenants and provide that upon the default on one of
these covenants or upon general adverse material changes in the borrowing firm's financial state the entire claim of the creditor shall become due and payable, regardless of the original schedule of
payments. This Paper explored the functions of acceleration clauses
in light of the fact that upon a firm's financial distress many creditors
find that collection actions are by and large useless.
This Paper argued that the primary roles of acceleration are to perfect a complex set of governance mechanisms within the corporate
setting. The most apparent role is to complement the debt covenants
in deterring borrower misbehavior. This Paper has shown, however,
that this role of acceleration loses force when the firm has already
deteriorated financially. Yet, acceleration plays two additional roles.
First, it facilitates the commencement of bankruptcy and thus curtails
any prospective losses to the creditors. Secondly, cross-accelerations
establish a mutual balance of terror between the various creditors and
prevent them from premature liquidation of the firm. Instead, crossacceleration leads the parties to engage in collective negotiations and
work out a comprehensive restructuring of the firm's finance.

76. For a negotiations oriented view of formal reorganizations under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code see Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1938-39 (2006).

